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Abstract 
This research attempts to enrich debate by addressing the relationship of the China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
with the Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Currently, it is a common phenomenon where a regional 
economic grouping bringing together several of China’s important BRI partners including Russia and Central 
Asian countries. Since 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) initiated, developed, and has been promptly 
placed among the top priorities of China’s foreign policy consideration in Beijing. One of the BRI’s cooperation 
priorities is unimpeded trade, which implies the improvement of the investment and trade facilitation and 
removal of the recurrent investment and trade barriers. Despite its apparent flexibility and openness to 
embracing existing regional and multilateral platforms, there has been little debate on the compatibility of the 
BRI objectives with the existing economic integration projects. Thus, it raises a question on how these two 
initiatives go along smoothly, why it needs to be developed and how it will be develop. Meanwhile, it exists also 
the U.S-China trade war which has been going intensively for two years since 2017. It addresses the current 
progress in bridging the two major economic projects and outlines the strategic decision-making priority 
directions for further coordination between these two global major powers. 
Keywords: China, Russia, belt and road initiative, Eurasia economic union, strategic decision 
 
Abstrak 
 
Penelitian ini berupaya memperkaya debat dengan membahas hubungan Tiongkok Inisiatif Jalan dan Sabuk 
(BRI) dengan Rusia Uni Ekonomi Eurasia (EAEU). Saat ini, merupakan fenomena umum di mana 
pengelompokan ekonomi regional menyatukan beberapa mitra Tiongkok Inisiatif Jalan dan Sabuk (BRI) yang  
penting  termasuk dengan Rusia dan negara-negara Asia Tengah. Sejak 2013, Inisiatif Jalan dan Sabuk (BRI) 
(BRI) diinisiasi, dikembangkan, dan telah ditempatkan di antara prioritas utama pertimbangan kebijakan luar 
negeri Tiongkok di Beijing. Salah satu prioritas kerjasama Inisiatif Jalan dan Sabuk (BRI) adalah perdagangan 
tanpa hambatan, yang menyiratkan peningkatan investasi dan fasilitasi perdagangan dan penghapusan investasi 
berulang dan hambatan perdagangan. Terlepas dari adanya fleksibilitas dan keterbukaan untuk merangkul 
platform kawasan dan multilateral yang ada, muncul sedikit perdebatan tentang kompatibilitas tujuan Inisiatif 
Jalan dan Sabuk (BRI) dengan proyek integrasi ekonomi yang ada. Oleh karena itu, hal ini menimbulkan 
pertanyaan tentang bagaimana kedua inisiatif ini berjalan dengan mudah, mengapa perlu dikembangkan dan 
bagaimana hal itu akan dikembangkan. Sementara itu, muncul perang dagang Amerika Serikat-Tiongkok yang 
telah berlangsung secara intensif selama dua tahun sejak 2017. Ini membahas kemajuan saat ini dalam 
menjembatani dua proyek ekonomi utama dan menguraikan arah prioritas pengambilan keputusan strategis 
untuk koordinasi lebih lanjut antara kedua kekuatan utama global. 
 
Kata-kunci: Tiongkok, Rusia, inisiatif sabuk dan jalan, uni ekonomi Eurasia, keputusan strategis 
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1. Introduction 
 
There are many regional integration and cooperation mechanisms and initiatives in 
Eurasia, of which the most influential is undoubtedly the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
proposed by China. Nearly 160 countries and international organizations have signed 
partnership agreements with China. As far as post-Soviet space is concerned, the highest level 
of integration is represented by the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).  
For over seventy years, China and Russia have played active roles in international 
affairs and global governance, and made important contributions to maintaining world peace 
and stability as well as international fairness and justice. 
In Moscow, on 5 June 2019, China and Russia agreed to upgrade their relations to a 
comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era. The decision was made at 
a meeting between visiting Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart, 
Vladimir Putin (XINHUA.NET, 6 June 2019). In Kremlin, the two heads of state highly 
evaluated the development of bilateral ties over the past 70 years (1949-2019), agreed to 
uphold the notion of good neighborliness and win-win cooperation, develop a comprehensive 
strategic partnership of coordination for a new era in a bid to take bilateral ties to a higher 
level and better benefit the peoples of the two countries and the world as well. 
On April 25 to 27, 2019, the 2
nd
 Belt and Road Forum (BRF) for International 
Cooperation held in Beijing and attended by Russian President, Vladimir Putin. The Chinese 
President Xi Jinping also officially invited Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, Chilean 
President Sebastian Pinera, Indonesia Vice President, Jusuf Kalla, Laos President Bounnhang 
Vorachith, Mongolian President Khaltmaa Battulga, Nepali President Bidya Devi Bhandari, 
Portuguese President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa and President of the Swiss Confederation Ueli 
Maurer joined 2019 event and pay state visits to China respectively (CGTN, 19 April 2019). 
There are 37 heads of state or government and other leaders from Austria, Egypt, Italy and 
Laos attended the forum. France, Germany, the UK, Spain, Japan, South Korea and the EU 
also sent high-level representatives to the forum. 
The Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi declared significantly that 
126 countries and 29 international organizations have signed cooperation agreements with 
China to jointly build the Belt and Road (CGTN, 19 April 2019). Up to April 2019, the total 
trade volume between China and participating countries has surpassed USD 6 (six) trillion, 
investment has exceeded USD 80 billion, and the 82 cooperation parks built by China and 
relevant countries have created nearly 300,000 jobs, bringing enormous development 
opportunities for the countries involved and laying a solid foundation for China to host the 
second Belt and Road Forum. Since 2017, the Belt and Road with concerted efforts is 
becoming a clean road for cooperation, prosperity, openness, green development and win-win 
outcome that will benefit people of all countries. 
The 2
nd
 BRF aims to bring about high-quality cooperation under the Belt and Road 
framework, through specific theme of "Belt and Road Cooperation, Shaping a Brighter Shared 
Future”. The BRF is the highest level platform for international cooperation under the Belt 
and Road framework and is the most important event China hosted formally. 
The construction of the China One Belt and One Road should implement an 
innovative cooperation model, which, at the current stage, is not a supranational mechanism, 
nor a model at the same level with the Customs Union or the Economic Union (Feng & 
Wang, 2015, p. 35). 
The Chinese President, Xi Jinping, announced the launch of the Silk Road Economic 
Belt (Laruelle, 2015a; 2015b; Peyrouse & Raballand, 2015) at Nazarbayev University in 
Astana during his visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People‟s Republic of China, 7 September 2013).  
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Meanwhile, the Maritime Silk Road was subsequently unveiled at the Indonesian 
Parliament in Jakarta during his visit to Indonesia in October 2013 (Yong Wang, 2016). 
Jointly labeled as the “Belt and Road Initiative” (hereinafter: BRI), this cooperation initiative, 
if fully realized, would bring together over 70% of the world‟s population, which accounts for 
about 55% of global GDP and has about 75% of discovered energy reserves (World 
Economic Forum, 22 September 2015). The BRI has been promptly placed among the top 
priorities of China‟s foreign policy, which were discussed at the Peri- phery Diplomacy Work 
Forum in October 2013, shortly after President Xi returned from his visit to Indonesia (see 
generally: Swaine, 2014; Swaine, 2015a). Chinese scholars analysing the media response to 
the BRI indicate a significant increase in BRI-related studies after the plans were crystallized 
in 2014 (Min Ye, 2015, p. 217; Swaine, 2015b). 
 
2. Pan Regional Cooperation Initiative: Connecting China BRI & Russia Eurasia 
 
Judging from the nature of the two initiatives, there is no contradiction in principle 
between the BRI and the EAEU. The Eurasian Economic Union is a highly integrated 
organization with complete mechanisms for decision-making, implementation and resolution 
of differences. And the BRI is a pan-regional cooperation initiative, a cooperation platform 
without an entry bar and with strong inclusiveness. There is no fundamental conflict between 
the two, which serves as the basis for their connection.  
Based from the internal and external environment, the connection of the two initiatives 
is the result of strategic thinking by China and Russia. It is inevitable rather than just a tactical 
compromise made by the two countries to create an atmosphere for strategic partnership. At 
least there are two major reasons for both countries to connect and integrate this economic 
cooperation into reality.  
First of all, changes in the external environment require closer cooperation between 
China and Russia. The most prominent change is that the U.S uses fair and free trade as the 
pretext to build a small circle that excludes China and Russia through bilateral negotiations 
and to reconstruct a new trade order dominated by the U.S and other developed countries.  
While, based on the perspective of geopolitics, the U.S strategy of containing China and 
Russia will not change. China and Russia do not want to spoil their relations with the U.S. 
However, the two countries also know very well that it is much easier to fall foul of the 
United States than get along well with it. 
Secondly, the Eurasian Economic Union desires to strengthen cooperation with the 
outside world. From a technical point of view, the economies of the member countries of the 
union are homogeneous and the transfer of production is limited. For example, Russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan are all energy and chemical producers and exporters. 
There is a demand for raw materials trading, but there is also competition rather than 
complementarity in terms of finished products. As the largest economy in the EAEU, Russia 
has neither the capital to invest abroad nor the extra production capacity to be transferred 
abroad. Therefore, countries in the union place their hopes for economic development on the 
outside world. In February 2016, President Nazarbayev proposed to designate 2016 as the 
year to deepen the economic relations of the Union with third countries and key trade blocs, 
which reflects the union's desire to strengthen economic and trade ties with the outside world 
(Li Ziguo, 2019).  
However, among the potential partners, all countries regard China, which has 
abundant foreign exchange reserves and is eager to go global, as the ideal pick. 
On 28 March 2015, with the endorsement of the State Council (The State Council of 
the People‟s Republic of China, 2015), the National Development and Reform Commission, 
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the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) jointly released 
the Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative.  
In fact, the BRI Action Plan labels this initiative a positive endeavor to seek new 
models of international cooperation and global governance (BRI Action Plan - Section I 
Background, 2015). It specifies that the initiative will abide by market rules and international 
norms so that the market will play a decisive role in resource allocation (BRI Action Plan - 
Section II Principles, 2015).  
Therefore, it calls for the development of the Eurasian Land Bridge via three 
economic corridors: 1) China-Mongolia- Russia; 2) China-Central Asia West Asia; and 3) 
China-Indochina Peninsula (BRI Action Plan - Section III Framework, 2015). Some 
International Relations scholars have quickly labeled the BRI vision documents as Sino-
centric “extension, consolidation and political elevation of pre-existing policy ideas and 
practice at the sub-national level in China” (Summers, 2016, p. 1634). After comparison with 
other initiatives such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP), or the US-led New Silk Road, it was suggested that China‟s 
new Silk Road has long-built political and developmental aspirations in the region that could 
not be met with alternative frameworks (Min Ye, 2015, p. 222). 
One of the BRI‟s cooperation priorities is unimpeded trade, which implies the 
improvement of the investment and trade facilitation and removal of the recurrent investment 
and trade barriers. The BRI Action plan also provides for the opening of free trade areas (Lin, 
2015). The countries along the BRI are encouraged to enhance customs cooperation and to 
ratify and implement the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (Trade Facilitation Agreement, 
December 2013). The initiative calls for the lowering of non-tariff barriers, improving the 
transparency of technical trade measures, enhancing trade liberalization and facilitation (BRI 
Action Plan - Section IV Unimpeded Trade, 2015). 
It could be some cooperation mechanisms envisaged by the BRI in order to achieve 
the aforementioned objectives. However, what sort of regulatory framework should be 
established for the legal support of the BRI connectivity projects? Suppose, the BRI Action 
plan provides for engagement in the bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms. 
It echoes the approach adopted at the 18
th
 National Congress of the Communist Party 
of China: “Multilateral, bilateral, and regional opening ups and co- operation are the three 
important pillars of the Chinese foreign economy, trade, and cooperation” (Feng & Wang, 
2015, p. 57). It means a platform for further dialogue and cooperation on many levels, 
engaging, if necessary, the existing governance structures, which is not a union or new 
organization with supra-national structures. The platform development has been echoed in the 
Macao SAR Five Year Development Plan (2016–2020) which expressly mentions the 
influence by the BRI and the China‟s Five Year Plan (Macao SAR 5 Year Development Plan, 
2016-2020)  As noted by President Xi in his keynote speech “To- wards a Community of 
Common Destiny and A New Future for Asia” delivered at the 2015 Boao Forum for Asia in 
Hainan, “To develop the Belt and Road is not to replace existing mechanisms or initiatives for 
regional cooperation. Much to the contrary, we will build on the existing basis to help 
countries align their development strategies and form complementarity” (Boao Forum for 
Asia Annual Conference, 2015). 
Thus, while the buildup of the BRI cooperation platform and mechanisms is still an 
ongoing process, the contributions from various stakeholders such governmental and non-
governmental, national and multinational, public and private in various disciplines can 
contribute to their development. While the implementation of the BRI has been addressed in 
academic circles of political science (Blanchard & Flint, 2017), international relations (Yong 
Wang, 2016), economics and business (Haiyue Liu, Yingkai Tang, Xiaolan Chen & Poznan- 
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ska, 2017), relatively little attention has been accorded to the legal founda- tions for the 
envisaged cooperation mechanisms (Wolff & Chao Xi (eds), 2016; Wang, 2017).  
The bilateral interactions of individual countries with China within the framework of 
BRI cooperation have been discussed in comparative length (Ghouri, A., 2016, p. 36-68) 
while the discussion on its interaction with the existing economic integration projects has not 
yet been sufficiently developed (Haitao Huang, 2017, p.45-59). The present paper is aimed at 
enriching the debate by addressing the relationship of the BRI project with the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU), a regional economic grouping bringing together several of China‟s 
important BRI partners. 
 
3. The Contribution of BRI on EURASIA  
 
It is precisely because of the strategic need for connection that the process has been 
very smooth. It takes only three years for such a connection to be fully realized from the time 
the idea was put forward.  
On May 8, 2015, China and Russia signed the Joint Statement on Cooperation on the 
Construction of Joint Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Projects (Li Ziguo, 2019). 
China supports the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union while Russia formally and explicitly 
supports China's Silk Road Economic Belt Initiative.   
If the above statement is only a preliminary plan for the general direction of 
cooperation and is more of a political gesture, then one year later, in June 2016, a joint 
statement of the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) and the Ministry of Commerce of the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) on the principal conclusion of negotiations on the 
agreement on trade and economic cooperation was signed (Li Ziguo, 2019). It indicates that 
both sides hope to speed up the process of integration and cooperation in the context of the 
reconstruction of the international political and economic order and will carry out substantive 
measures rather than just talk show.  
Meanwhile, in October 2016, the two sides held the first round of negotiations. In 
October 2017, the two sides concluded negotiations. On May 17, 2018, the Agreement on 
Trade and Economic Cooperation between the EAEU and China was signed, covering 13 
chapters, including customs cooperation and trade facilitation, intellectual property rights, 
departmental cooperation, e-commerce and government procurement. It marked that the 
economic and trade cooperation between China and the EAEU countries entered a new stage 
driven by projects. In December 2018, the economic and trade cooperation agreement entered 
into force.  
At the heart of the connection between the BRI and EAEU is the mutual coordination 
of China's and Russia's economic interests in Eurasia and the search for the greatest common 
denominator for the interests of all parties after taking into account the demands of member 
states. The connection will bring tangible benefits to the BRI and EAEU countries.  
For China, the political significance is that it dispels the worries of the entire Eurasian 
region so that countries don't have to worry about the need to choose between China and 
Russia. The economic significance is that it provides institutional arrangements for customs 
facilitation and e-commerce, which is conducive to the exchange of goods and personnel.  
Thus, for EAEU member states, the connection can better attract Chinese investment 
and accelerate the implementation of joint projects. More importantly, it can help EAEU 
countries access China's huge market, especially in agricultural produce. Connection is a 
process without an endpoint. It is necessary to find an optimal point in the continuous 
running-in process so as to minimize the institutional cost for cooperation between China and 
EAEU member states, accelerate the landing of projects and ultimately benefit the people of 
all countries. 
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4. The Eurasian Economic Union as Eurasian Integration Interest 
 
It is this narrative of a functional, rules-based integration that explains the EAEU‟s 
appeal to various European politicians, officials and experts. In looking for pragmatic 
solutions to tensions between Russia and the EU, some scholars believe that the EAEU may 
contribute to the creation of the much coveted ideal of a free trade area from Lisbon to 
Vladivostok that could act as a ready-made tool for peace and prosperity (Dragneva & 
Wolczuk, 2017).  
In fact, the origins of the EAEU should be traced back to 1999 when the Russian 
Federation and the Republic of Belarus entered into an agreement to establish a union 
between the two countries (Treaty on the Establishment of the Eurasian Economic 
Community, 10 October 2000). By 2000, the project had been joined by the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Tajikistan transforming it into the 
Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). This agreement concerns the creation of the 
united customs territory and the creation of the Customs Union on 6 October, 2007. 
Thus, economic integration had been prompted by, among other things, the disastrous 
impact of the market-oriented economic policies on the post-Soviet economies (Dzarasov, 
2016). The next step envisaged by the members of the EurAsEC was the creation of the 
Common Economic Space, which was supposed to include Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Ukraine. This initiative, however, was short-lived due to the orange revolution in Ukraine in 
2004 (Katchanovski, 2008). As a result, the 2007 Agreement establishing a Customs Union 
was concluded by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (The Customs Union, 6 October, 2007).  
The Agreement established the Customs Union Commission in order to monitor and 
foster the processes of economic integration. In January 2010 the common customs tariff was 
implemented at the external borders of the Customs Union. The Eurasian Economic 
Commission, the first supra-national organization established in this region after the 
disintegration of the USSR, was headquartered in Moscow. The year 2015 saw the 
establishment and the enlargement of the EAEU to also include the Republic of Armenia and 
the Republic of Kyrgyz. On 29 May 2015 the EAEU concluded its first free trade agreement 
with the Republic Socialist of Vietnam (FTA EAEU-Vietnam, 29 May 2016).  
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) brings together 182 million people; it 
occupies first place in crude oil (14.6%), second place in natural gas (18.4%), sixth place in 
coal (5.8%), fourth place in electricity generation (5.1%), and fifth place in steel (4.5%); it has 
1,605,000 km of roads (fifth place or 2.5%), and 107,000 km of rail- roads which first place 
or 7.8% (Eurasian Economic Commission, 2016). 
Decision-making in the EAEU Commission is largely consensus-based with the 
limited use of qualified majority voting for low level decisions, which on one hand slows 
down the efficiency of decision-making but on the other relieves the dominance of the bigger 
players such as Russia (Roberts & Moshes, 2016). For example, while the EAEU framework 
contains common competition rules, their enforcement is heavily reliant on the cooperation of 
the national competition authorities of the member states, which can obstruct the prevention 
and prohibition of anti-competitive business practices that may have cross-border effects on 
EAEU trade (Rudomino & Zakharov, 2014).  
Moreover, as a result, the supra-national structures of the EAEU are heavily reliant on 
the commitment of the national governments while the ideas for supra-national parliamentary 
integration within the EAEU have not yet found any significant support from the political 
leadership of its members (Naryshkin, S., 2012). 
Since its establishment, the EAEU has been followed by the discussion as to the 
profitability of this economic integration for each of its members, which are different in size, 
population and the specifics of their national economies. Generally, it can be argued that 
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Russia‟s EAEU partners have benefited from the customs union, economically at least, in the 
following ways: the redistribution of customs tariffs (Andronova, 2016, p. 9) and the 
increasing use of their transport infrastructure for the transit of Chinese exports towards the 
EU. The EU-Russia and the U.S-Russia confrontation over Ukraine (Neuwirth & Svetlicinii, 
2016) and Russia‟s ban on food imports from the EU, the U.S and Ukraine benefited EAEU 
members such as Belarus, which significantly increased its food exports into Russian markets. 
There is also evidence of the relocation of Russian companies to Kazakhstan and Belarus due 
to lower taxes and lower administrative burdens in these jurisdictions (Andronova, 2016, p. 
11). 
At the same time, the volumes of intra-EAEU trade are currently decreasing. For 
example, when compared to the period 2000–2014, the share of EAEU trade in the trade 
volumes of its members has been falling: Russia (7.7% to 7.1%), Kazakhstan (20.8% to 
18.4%), Belarus (58.6% to 23.8%) (Ibid., p. 14). In 2013, the transit volumes in Russia and 
Belarus fell, while in Kazakhstan they were on the rise. It was suggested that the transport 
sector of the EAEU needs a new im- pulse, which should be realized through the development 
of the transit corridors (Panteleev, Pochtarev & Chalaja, 2015). EAEU trade can be also 
characterized as Russia-centered since the trade amongst other EAEU members remains 
marginal. For other EAEU members Russia is the largest trading partner while China is 
ranked second (Ustyuzhanina, 2016).  
Interestingly enough, the EAEU did not undertake any significant steps towards the 
development of the internal transport infrastructure, which would facilitate trade flows within 
the EAEU. While the establishment of the customs union had a positive effect on the volumes 
of mutual trade (between 2000 and 2013 it grew by 37%), lately it has been on the decrease 
due to the devaluation of the Russian currency and falling prices of the energy carriers (Ibid., 
p. 39). Among other problems of EAEU integration are the absence of diversified exports, the 
undeveloped transport infrastructure and low volumes of intra-EAEU trade (Kukushkina & 
Ostrovskaya, 2013).  
Initially, the EAEU was regarded as a costly choice for Central Asian countries as 
their tariff rates in the customs union had been Russianized i.e. increased up to levels of 
Russian tariffs. As a result, these countries lost a certain volume of imports from third 
countries to the benefit of Russian companies. However, after Russia‟s accession to the WTO, 
the level of the tariffs fell by 40–50%. Additionally, the EAEU offered further economic 
benefits to its members in the form of free movement of la- bour and services, efforts to 
reduce non-tariff barriers and improve trade facilitation, etc. (Tarr, 2016, pp. 18–19).  
At the same time, it should be noted that beyond trade liberalization which reduction 
and unification of tariffs, there has been little coordination in other policy areas and the top-
down approach adopted by the EAEU members for their economic integration has been at 
least partly responsible for stifling the innovation and competitiveness vis-a-vis other 
economic integration blocks such as the EU (Hartwell, 2016). The economic integration 
scholars have continuously voiced calls for further coordination of industrial policy by 
establishing an EAEU ministry of economy, creation of EAEU multinationals, and fostering 
coordination of heavy industries and agriculture (Andronova, 2016, pp. 18–19). 
The situation in Ukraine has definitely affected both the prospects of further EAEU 
integration and the tensions amongst its members. For other members the accession of 
Ukraine could imply the dilution of Russia‟s decisive influence. It was argued that for EAEU 
members, Russia is seen both as an unavoidable partner but also a threat (Roberts & Moshes, 
2015, p. 13.). Russia‟s ban on food imports from the EU/US and other countries (Neuwirth & 
Svetlicinii, 2015) was not supported by Belarus and Kazakhstan, with imports flowing 
through these two EAEU member states (Roberts & Moshes, 2015, pp. 14–15; Sakwa, 2016, 
p. 13). It was argued that for Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan the value of the EAEU is 
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significantly reduced if it undermines their relations with third countries (Roberts & Moshes, 
2015, p. 18).  
After the Ukraine crisis and the deterioration in EU-Russia and the U.S-Russia 
relations, the Asian vector received more importance as Russia turned to the East in an 
attempt to engage more with Greater Asia. As the EAEU was intended to grow from an 
economic to a geopolitical project, the events in Ukraine are an example of how geopolitics 
has slowed down the economic development of this ambitious integrationist project (Wilson, 
2016, p. 127). 
There has also been a drastic change in the rhetoric and narrative of EAEU integration 
discourse: while prior to the Ukraine crisis it was an all-encompassing cooperation project 
from Lisbon to Vladivostok or even from Vancouver to Vladivostok, the confrontation with 
the West over Ukraine changed the dimension to from Murmansk to Hong Kong with 
Russia‟s focus on its bilateral relations with China and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, SCO (Vysotskaya & Vieira, 2016, p. 570). It was suggested by the Russian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov that: “The new union will be open for interested 
countries to join. We expect it to become a hub effectively connecting Europe and the Asia-
Pacific” (Lavrov, 2013, p.6-12). 
Russia‟s actions in relation to Ukraine prompted concerns over sovereignty and 
territorial integrity in other EAEU members. Nevertheless, despite these tensions, “this 
organizational format is probably the only way for the smaller states to restrain Russia‟s 
actions as the regional hegemon” (Ibid., p. 577). The 2015 public opinion polls conducted in 
the EAEU member states indicated that citizens of Kyrgyzstan (86%), Kazakhstan (80%) and 
Russia (78%) overwhel- mingly support the Eurasian integration processes. The population of 
Armenia (56%) and Belarus (60%) demonstrated more skepticism towards EAEU 
development, while Tajikistan demonstrated the highest support for this regional integrationist 
project among the non-EAEU countries (Kudaibergenova, 2016, p. 105). In analyz- ing the 
diverging positions of the Eurasian optimists and Eurasian skeptics, it can be argued that the 
EAEU project is still justified by the current trends of shifting from a state-centered system to 
a global system with regional associations of states (Vasilieva & Lagutina, 2013). 
 
5. Aligning China BRI into Russia Eurasia 
 
Kazakhstan President, Nursultan Nazarbayec stated clearly that the dynamics of the 
world economy, which has entered the fourth industrial revolution, have raised the issue of 
integrating the integrations. It is the formation of common points of economic growth 
between the Eurasian Economic Union and the Economic belt of the Great Silk Road which 
has huge prospects (Nazarbayev, 2016).  
China‟s experience in interacting with the EAEU countries as a group can be traced to 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). All EAEU members are involved in the works 
of the SCO. Belarus is an observer state and Armenia is a dialogue partner.  
It was established in 2001 by Kazakhstan, China, the Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2016). At the 2016 SCO 
Summit in Tashkent, India and Pakistan initiated their process of accession to the SCO, which 
has been completed at the 2017 SCO Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan. Relations between the 
SCO and the forerunner to the EAEU, the EurAsEC, began in 2006 with the signing of a 
memorandum of understanding between the executive secretariat of EurAsEC and the 
permanent secretariat of the SCO (Eurasian Economic Community, 8 May 2006). The EAEU 
was initially envisaged as an economic union, leading to further political alignment of its 
member states.  
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The SCO, on the other hand, first emerged as a peace-building and border disputes 
resolution mechanism. The institutional structures of the two organizations are also quite 
different as EAEU encompasses two supra-national institutions such the Eurasian Economic 
Commission and the Court.  
Meanwhile the SCO functions on an intra-state level through periodic meetings. China 
has already attempted to promote greater economic integration through the SCO but with 
limited success as the organization continued to focus primarily on security issues. Since 
China will continue promoting economic integration in Eurasia, which will involve the EAEU 
states, it was argued that further coordination between the EAEU and the SCO is inevitable 
and should be encouraged (Yu Bin, 2015). For example, in 2015 the EAEU and the SCO held 
a joint business forum in Saint Petersburg where they launched a proposal concerning the 
development of a common digital space between the members of the two organizations 
(Eurasian Economic Commission, 18 June 2015).  
At their 2016 summit the SCO leaders reaffirmed their support for the BRI and 
expressed their interest in developing further cooperation along the Great Silk Road in various 
areas: public health, science and technology, education, environment protection, sports, 
tourism, and the study and preservation of cultural and natural heritage (Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, 23-24 June 2016). Some scholars believe that the significant 
attempts to establish a meaningful cooperation between the SCO which is a primarily 
security-oriented organization and the EAEU in economic integration could eventually lead to 
the establishment of a comprehensive Silk Road Union (Kembayev, 2016). 
The economic cooperation dialogue between China and the EAEU commenced prior 
to the announcement of the BRI. On 6 December 2012 the EAEU Commission and the 
MOFCOM concluded a Memorandum of Understanding concerning cooperation in trade 
matters (Eurasian Commission, 2012). A decision to start formal negotiations between the 
EAEU and China on the conclusion of a comprehensive product and transport vehicle 
information exchange agreement was taken at the end of 2014 (Eurasian Economic 
Commission, 7 October 2014).  
In a joint statement released on 8 May 2015, the EAEU Commission and the 
MOFCOM announced the launch of negotiations for the conclusion of the trade and economic 
cooperation agreement between China and the EAEU (Eurasian Economic Commission, 8 
May 2015). The free trade arrangement between China and the EAEU can currently only be 
achieved in relation to trade in goods, as the trade in services and the coordination of such 
with third countries is left by the EAEU Treaty to its member states (EAEU Treaty, Article 
38).  
On 8 May 2015 Russia and China issued a joint statement concerning cooperation for 
conjunction of the EAEU and BRI, where Russia expressed its support for BRI while China 
agreed with Russian efforts in developing EAEU economic integration (kremlin.ru, 8 May 
2015). The parties agreed to cooperate on a bilateral level as well as through the SCO 
platform. The following directions for cooperation were mapped in the Joint Statement: (1) 
trade and investment facilitation; (2) joint investment projects; (3) enhancing infrastructure 
connectivity; (4) free trade agreement between the EAEU and China in a long-term 
perspective; (5) promotion of SMEs; (6) facilitation of payments in national currencies; (7) 
cooperation within the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Silk Road Fund, SCO Interbank 
Consortium; (8) global trade and investment governance (Zeng, 2016). The commitment to 
docking the BRI with the EAEU was reaffirmed by both parties during President Putin‟s visit 
to Beijing in June 2016 (China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 June 2016). 
Despite the rapid developments in BRI-EAEU dialogue, the scholars have noted the 
differences in approaches towards the BRI by the two leading counterparts: Russia and China. 
In Russia, the Silk Road has traditionally been regarded as a transport infrastructure 
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connecting East and West where Russia would play a key role as the bridge connecting these 
two parts of the world. The EAEU from the outset had a dualist nature: on one hand it was 
seen as an extension of Greater Europe” from Lisbon to Vladivostok (kremlin.ru, 2012), but 
with the rise of China it also received a strong Asian vector (Sakwa, 2016, p. 5).  
For China, however, the BRI is primarily a belt rather than a road, meaning a space of 
economic development and prosperity where highly developed states are engaged in an 
intensive trade exchange (Makarov & Sokolova, 2016 pp. 48–50). What makes the 21st 
century Silk Road different from the ancient one is that today this road passes through 
sovereign states with different political and economic objectives.  
As a constructive result, one of the few issues that all of these Central Eurasian states 
have unanimously supported was the improvement of border management (Diener, 2015). 
Since the BRI is essentially based on the increase of various flows of goods, services, and 
people across those borders, this will present a tremendous challenge for those states inclined 
to protect their territorial sovereignty. In this sense, the builders of the BRI will have much to 
learn from the positive experience of the EAEU, which at least shares a common history of 
such flows in the modern era and has to a certain degree progressed in this direction such: free 
flow of goods, no visa regimes, abolition of border controls, etc. 
However, it should be also noted that the establishment of the EAEU was based on 
WTO standards and used the EU model of institutional integration such EAEU Commission 
and EAEU Court to indicate the potential of establishing a free trade zone with the EU 
(Kukushkina & Ostrovskaya, 2013). A hastening in recognition of the EAEU by the EU 
would be achieved by the accession of Kazakhstan and Belarus to the WTO (World Trade 
Organization, 2015).  
With the expansion of EU-China trade exchanges, the EAEU may lose sense as a 
common economic space. But, the success of the BRI will also rest on a good Russia-China 
relationship. If these are to deteriorate, Russia will employ frictional policies towards the 
countries of the Eurasian periphery to increase the costs of their rapprochement with China” 
(Samokhvalov, 2016). It should be noted that despite the current cordial relations between 
Russia and China, China‟s rising power and its overwhelming economic capabilities in 
comparison with Russia create a growing power disparity and the maintenance of some sort of 
equilibrium in Russian-Chi- nese interactions is a challenge (Wilson, 2016, p. 114. See also: 
Grigorenko, Klyuch- nikov, Gridchina, Litvinenko & Kolpak, 2016).  
Moreover, when discussing the rationale of other post-Soviet states that have not 
joined the EAEU project (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan) one should note their attempt to avoid Russian influence. But for most of these 
states the Russian vector is unavoidable so they will inevitably be involved in some sort of 
economic integration with Russia or its regional initiatives (see e.g.: Korosteleva, 2015). 
While, at the same time all of the above countries have expressed their interest in 
taking part in BRI projects. It was argued that in this context the institutionalization of this 
process will provide for more stability in the regional policies of the post-Soviet states but 
does not create conditions for long-term, sustainable development of these projects (Skriba, 
2014, p. 95). The BRI should be able to provide such economic cooperation in long-term 
perspective. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
For physical infrastructure to be successful there is a parallel system of soft 
infrastructure – laws, policies, practices, and standards that are less easily installed and 
monitored than physical structures but every bit as important if the physical infrastructures of 
transportation, communication, and energy are going to be successful. 
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The EAEU, the SCO and the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa) have been regarded as the embryo of post-Western order.  
The BRI led by China engages numerous members of these economic and political 
groupings. Up until now, BRI development has been pursued primarily on a bilateral level 
between China and the interested countries along the envisaged BRI routes. It was argued that 
the BRI should be viewed primarily as a cooperation platform rather than a formal economic 
integration model like the EU or the EAEU. Nevertheless, despite its apparent flexibility and 
openness to embrace the existing regional and multilateral platforms, there has been little 
debate on the compatibility of the BRI objectives with the existing economic integration 
projects. It has been an attempt to address the possibility of integration of the BRI projects 
with the existing economic governance framework of the EAEU. 
Both the EAEU and the BRI projects have been criticized for the stark inequality of 
the participating members. The discrepancies in size among member states culminated in 
palpable state-centric concerns that the EAEU would facilitate Russian hegemony in Central 
Asia while the BRI and SCO could lay the foundation for Chinese dominance. For the same 
reasons it could be beneficial for the EAEU members to act together as a stronger negotiating 
partner with China, and for China it could be a faster step towards a single tariff and single 
customs zone of the EAEU. 
In discussing Eurasian economic integration, Russian scholars noted that one of the 
intellectual problems of the EAEU is that Russia was always clear about what it builds but not 
why it builds these structures, and the EAEU project has never been properly addressed by 
Russian high-ranking officials. The true intentions and possible implications of the BRI 
project go far beyond economic rationale. In this sense, the promoters of the BRI could learn 
from the EAEU experience and make sure that non-economic objectives are clearly presented, 
widely publicized and accepted by the countries that join the initiative. 
The envisaged BRI encompasses all EAEU members, which make the interaction of 
these two economic cooperation and integration platforms inevitable. The scholars have 
outlined various directions for EAEU development along the BRI such as: 1) integration in 
the transport and logistics infrastructure of Eurasia, 2) the strengthening of trans-border 
industrial cooperation, and 3) the enhancement of economic integration up to the 
establishment of the comprehensive Eurasian Union. 
Regardless of its actual path, the integration of integrations in the case of the BRI and 
the EAEU is a reality and further academic debate on their conjugation should be encouraged. 
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